Political trust and distrust in Switzerland: A normative analysis by Scheidegger, R. & Staerklé, C.
Political Trust and Distrust in Switzerland:
A Normative Analysis
Re´gis Scheidegger and Christian Staerkle´
University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Abstract: Based on data from a Swiss survey study (N = 769), this research investigated individ-
ual-level determinants of trust in political authorities from a social psychological perspective. The
study demonstrates that individuals with a low level of education who feel materially at risk and
politically powerlessness expressed the lowest levels of political trust. This relationship was
explained with diﬀerential endorsement of normative beliefs. A mediation analysis reveals that
normative perceptions of Swiss society as being threatened by immorality and growing social
inequalities accounted for the eﬀect of perceived material risk on political distrust. The rejection of
a duty-based citizenship norm (voting), in turn, mediated the impact of political powerlessness on
distrust. Political orientation was unrelated to political trust. These ﬁndings illustrate the cognitive
underpinnings of political alienation and suggest that perceived lack of political agency and
perceived risk of social declassiﬁcation are key factors in understanding political distrust.
Keywords: Trust-in-Government, Social-Order, Social-Representations, Social-Status, Political-
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Introduction1
In contemporary democratic societies, trust in institutions is at the heart of the political
debate. Opinion polls and survey research regularly ﬁnd cause for alarming claims concern-
ing the vanishing trust in political authorities and low voter turnout (for Switzerland, e.g.,
Brunner and Sgier, 1997). Against this background of supposedly threatened ties between
the government and its citizenry, the analysis of the determinants of political trust has
attracted strong attention in political science research (cf. Anderson and Singer, 2008;
Cantril and Cantril, 1999; Citrin and Muste 1999; Cook and Gronke, 2005; Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse, 2001; Lipset and Schneider, 1987; Mishler and Rose, 2001). In the present
research, we propose an original normative analysis of political trust based on shared beliefs
about citizenship and various types of threats to social order held by members of high and
low status groups. We argue that these shared beliefs serve as normative reference knowl-
edge in political debates on the basis of which citizens make up their minds on political
authorities.
The study of normative factors underlying political trust is amazingly scarce (e.g., Devos
et al. 2002). The present research aims to contribute to ﬁll to this gap by proposing an
analysis of trust in the Swiss government and political authorities informed by social
1
This research was supported with a grant by the Swiss National Science Foundation 101514-118232 ⁄ 1. We thank
Benoıˆt Dompnier, Jan Mewes and Tiina Likki for helpful comments on an earlier version of the article. Both
authors contributed equally to the article.
Swiss Political Science Review 17(2): 164–187 doi:10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02010.x
 2011 Swiss Political Science Association
representations theory (Augoustinos et al. 2006; Doise et al. 1993; Moscovici, 2000;
2008[1961]). The goal of this approach is to reconstruct the cognitive foundations of citizen
opinions on political institutions, and thereby to gain a better understanding why citizens
trust or distrust political authorities. In other words, if social positions predict the level of
trust, the reasons are to be found in the diﬀerential endorsement of normative beliefs shared
by individuals as a function of their membership in status categories. Controlling for classi-
cal predictors of political trust such as gender, age (cf. Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Citrin
and Muste 1999; Kelleher and Woldak, 2007), and political ideology (cf. Citrin and Muste
1999; Gro¨nlund and Seta¨la¨, 2007), our approach articulates two categories of determinants
of political trust. Political trust will ﬁrst be analysed as a function of social position, com-
posed of social status (deﬁned by education level, income and subjective personal risk
assessment) and political integration (perceived powerlessness in political decision-making
and political interest). Second, in order to understand why social status and political inte-
gration aﬀect political trust, we investigate the extent to which normative beliefs about
social order mediate, i.e. account for, the eﬀects of social status and political integration on
political trust. More speciﬁcally, citizenship norms (Dalton, 2008) and social order beliefs
concerning moral values, alleged free riding, menacing cultural diversity and illegitimate
social inequality (Staerkle´, 2009) are expected to account for the eﬀects of social status and
political integration on trust.
Social Representations and Political Attitudes
Our approach goes a step further than studies which have investigated the role of values
and norms as predictors of institutional trust (e.g., Devos et al. 2002; Gro¨nlund and Seta¨la¨,
2007; Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Hetherington, 1998; Brunner and Sciarini, 2002), since
it aims to simultaneously account for the social origins of norms and values and their
impact on political trust. Thereby, norms and values are not conceived of as arbitrary indi-
vidual preferences, but as socially constructed reference knowledge which orients citizens’
political attitudes according to their position in society (Bourdieu 1984[1979]; Bourdieu and
Boltanski 2008[1976]; Staerkle´, 2009; Van der Waal et al. 2007). This approach is grounded
in social representations theory which studies collective deﬁnitions of reality and socially sit-
uated cognition as the result of everyday communication within and between social groups
(Augoustinos et al., 2006; Elcheroth et al. (in press); Wagner and Hayes, 2005). In this view,
observed diﬀerences in political attitudes between social categories reﬂect diﬀerences in
social experiences and in the interpretations of these experiences which are to a large extent
determined by positions in the social hierarchy (Cle´mence, 2001; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2002; Sida-
nius and Pratto, 1999). Groups develop normative beliefs and values which reﬂect and deal
with everyday experiences and contingencies; group members then draw on such shared
knowledge—social representations—to form political attitudes (Staerkle´ et al. in press).
Political attitudes such as trust in institutions are then seen as the outcome of a process
whereby citizens position themselves toward shared normative knowledge (Cle´mence, 2001).
Social representations can therefore be deﬁned as normative organizing principles of politi-
cal attitudes (Bourdieu 1984[1979]; Doise, 2005; Doise et al. 1993).
This process of opinion formation is based on the assumption that present-day political
attitudes of individuals are ‘‘anchored’’ in past experiences. Two forms of anchoring
(Moscovici 2008) can be distinguished. First, social anchoring refers to the inﬂuence of expe-
riences in pre-existing social groups and categories on political attitudes, in particular the
impact of membership in high and low status groups (cf. Van der Waal et al. 2007). In the
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present study, such groups are deﬁned by social status and political integration. Normative
anchoring, in turn, refers to the assumption that political attitudes are ‘‘anchored’’ in pre-
existing beliefs which are generated by social groups and shared to various degrees by its
members, in particular normative beliefs concerning contrasting principles of social order.
In this study, political trust is expected to be normatively anchored in two sets of beliefs:
perceived threats to social order (Staerkle´, 2009) and citizenship norms (Dalton, 2008). We
therefore expect that membership in low- or high-status categories predicts diﬀerent levels
of political trust because of category-speciﬁc endorsements of these two types of normative
beliefs.
Political Trust
Research has extensively studied political trust as the subjective support given to a regime
(cf. Citrin and Muste 1999). Although there is considerable disagreement about what
exactly is measured with items assessing trust (Easton, 1975; Hardin, 1993), it seems
accepted that trust is associated with the evaluation of institutions (in terms of positive and
negative attitudes towards them), and that the core meaning of trust is that institutions will
act in the interest of the trusting (Mishler and Rose 1997). In general, it is assumed that
some level of trust in political institutions such as the government is a necessary condition
for a healthy democratic functioning, even though low levels of public trust in institutions,
like the decline in political participation, are regularly bemoaned (Citrin and Muste 1999;
Feygina and Tyler, 2009; Lipset and Schneider, 1987; Mishler and Rose, 1997; 2001; Tyler,
2001). Low levels of trust are indeed supposed to reﬂect dissociation or even alienation
between the citizenry and the government, which in turn leads to a lack of political legiti-
macy and potentially to a decrease in political participation (Gro¨nlund and Seta¨la¨, 2007).
In the present research, political trust is deﬁned as a diﬀuse and abstract form of trust in
democratic institutions (Anderson and Singer, 2008; Citrin, 1974; Citrin and Muste 1999;
Easton, 1975), as opposed to more speciﬁc forms of institutional support, for example trust
in implementing institutions like the police or courts. In their everyday lives, citizens are
indeed likely to have a more direct contact with the police than with the government or the
parliament. Political trust was thus assessed with a measure of trust in the Swiss govern-
ment and the parliament which reﬂects the perceived legitimacy of the Swiss governmental
regime.
Social Status and Political Trust
One of the most robust ﬁndings in the literature on political trust is that objectively assessed
high status positions in society are associated with greater political trust than low status
positions, deﬁned by income (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Hetherington, 1998; Mishler
and Rose, 2001) or by higher education (Citrin and Muste 1999; Kelleher and Woldak,
2007). Conversely, low income and being unemployed were negatively related to political
trust (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Anderson and Singer, 2008). These status eﬀects on
political trust are likely to reﬂect diﬀerent experiences associated with membership in status
groups. Residents of working class neighbourhoods may for example consider that while
authorities protect commercial city centres from disorder, their area suﬀers from a lack
of institutional consideration (Garland, 2001), which then translates into decreased levels
of trust in authorities. Similarly, research on the development of attitudes towards authori-
ties during adolescence has shown that low status distrust is a result of perceived social
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exclusion because individuals feel let down by the system and unprotected by law and
authorities (Emler and Reicher, 1995; 2005). Low status groups may therefore feel that their
interests are less well served by political institutions (Young, 1999). Given their relatively
secure and privileged social position, high status groups, in turn, are more likely than low
status groups to believe that institutions maintain an orderly and controllable environment
which serves their interests.
In addition to objective social status, subjective social status derived from perceptions of
one’s position in the social structure have also been shown to predict trust, in particular
one’s perceived ﬁnancial satisfaction (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Cook and Gronke,
2005). We therefore used perceived material risk as a subjective measure of social status
which assesses the perceived risk of social declassiﬁcation and thus complements the objec-
tive measures of income and education (Castel, 1995). In the Swiss context of the early nine-
ties, for instance, feeling materially at risk was linked to low trust in political authorities
(Brunner and Sgier, 1997), which implies that perceived material security should lead to
greater trust.
We expect members of low status groups—objectively deﬁned with a low level of educa-
tion and income, and subjectively with a heightened sense of material risk—to grant less
legitimacy to political authorities and therefore to express more distrustful attitudes than
high status groups.
Political Integration and Political Trust
The second set of variables which deﬁnes the social position of citizens is political inte-
gration, understood as the capacity and motivation to participate in the political process.
In line with the general idea that political competence guides political attitudes
(Converse, 1964), empirical evidence suggests that both political interest and political
knowledge are positively related to trust (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Anderson and
Singer, 2008; Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1993; Hethering-
ton, 1998). To the extent that political integration reﬂects political competence and
knowledge, it is highly dependent upon social status and education level. Gaxie (1978)
for example showed for a French sample that the more educated citizens had more polit-
ical interest and political competence than the less educated. It is therefore likely that
political integration leads to higher political legitimacy, because political interest and
knowledge enhances the capacity to understand the workings of the political system and
thereby increases political trust.
Yet, political integration is not only determined by political interest and knowledge, but
also by a more psychological feeling of empowerment and a sense of control over one’s life
which make political participation meaningful from the individual’s point of view. Political
participation was thus shown to be driven by the belief in one’s power to make things
change (Bennett, 2006; Dalton, 2008; Van Zomeren et al. 2008). Research on procedural
justice conﬁrms that considering oneself to be able to actively participate in political deci-
sion-making and feeling considered by institutions enhances support for political authorities
(Tyler, 2001; Feygina and Tyler, 2009). Consequently, we expect people who are interested
in politics who feel empowered in their political action to grant greater trust in Swiss politi-
cal authorities.
The psychological processes underlying political trust cannot be directly inferred from the
impact of social position and political integration on trust (Easton, 1975). A mediational
model is the appropriate analytical tool which allows reconstructing citizens’ thinking on
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trust. Our mediation model assumes that social status and political integration are associ-
ated with two sets of normative beliefs which shape political trust.
Perceived Threats to the Social Order
In any democratic society, the principles underlying social order are debated and contested
by both citizens and political actors, and within these debates citizens gradually develop
their own views on the normative priorities which should organize a society. They may for
example demand conformity with common values, emphasise meritocratic achievement, or
object to cultural diversity. In a social representations view, such normative beliefs and val-
ues are understood in terms of shared conceptions of social order rather than in terms of
individual preferences or stable personality dimensions (Staerkle´, 2009). Accounting for
political trust with conceptions of social order therefore requires a pluralistic approach
based on multiple deﬁnitions of social order which can be found in democratic debates.
In the present study, we analyse four lay conceptions of social order as normative beliefs
underlying political trust. Reﬂecting emblematic forms of social order, these conceptions
are called Moral Order, Free Market, Social Diversity and Structural Inequality (Staerkle´
et al. 2007; Staerkle´, 2009). Each conception is associated with a speciﬁc threat to social
order, and these four types of threats will be used to account for the relationship between
social status and political trust.
(1) In the Moral Order conception, the social order is based on expected conformity with
common moral principles. Accordingly, an orderly society is threatened by those who
disrespect central moral values (as evidenced in conservative statements of lacking moral
education and urban insecurity). Perceived moral order threat is expected to predict
lower political trust, because authorities are not seen as dealing adequately or eﬀectively
with norm-violating and immoral people.
(2) In the Free Market conception, the social order is based on economically liberal princi-
ples. Here, the social order is challenged by people who violate free market principles by
allegedly abusing common goods (as expressed in perceived ‘‘free riding’’ and taking
advantage of welfare beneﬁts). We again expect a negative relationship between per-
ceived free market threat and political trust: when people perceive welfare abuse as a
political problem, authorities are seen as not protecting the rights and assets of hard-
working people.
(3) In the Social Diversity conception, social order is based on the principle of national
homogeneity. Hence, social order is threatened by cultural diversity and otherness
(assessed with judgements of a threatening presence of immigrants and foreigners). The
more people perceive immigrants and foreigners as a political problem, the more they
should distrust authorities which are seen as promoting a multicultural agenda which
neglects the rights of Swiss nationals.
(4) In the Structural Inequality conception, the social order is based on egalitarian princi-
ples. Hence, the threat to social order stems from social inequality and from social dis-
tance between privileged and underprivileged social categories. When people perceive
inequality as a political problem, they are likely to distrust authorities because they
deem institutional action in favour of a more egalitarian society insuﬃcient.
Our general contention thus is that low levels of perceived threat to social order on these
four dimensions should lead individuals to consider that institutions eﬀectively deal with
these speciﬁc threats and dangers to the social order and therefore increase political trust.
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This should typically be the case for high status individuals whose trust in authorities and
institutions frees them from dealing with everyday contingencies. For them, institutions ‘‘do
their job’’ by maintaining a social order which is favourable to them. Institutional trust
reduces the complexity of the world (Luhmann, 1979; 2000) and favours action and risk
taking by individuals who can rely upon a relative stability of their social environment
(Lewicki et al. 1998). The situation is diﬀerent for members of low position groups. Greater
uncertainty related the political integration and vulnerability of low status positions gives
rise to stronger perceptions of social problems and a more pessimistic outlook on society
(Castel, 1995, Staerkle´ et al., 2007). Accordingly, we expect low position groups to experi-
ence greater threat to social order on all four dimensions and therefore also lower levels of
political trust.
Citizenship Norms
Citizenship norms are the second set of normative beliefs expected to predict political trust.
Challenging the general idea that political trust is fading away in contemporary democra-
cies, Dalton (2008) showed that political participation actually evolved towards new direc-
tions, that is, toward engaged and protesting forms of citizenship as contrasted with more
traditional forms of citizenship, based on the civic duty to participate in formal political
processes, in particular voting. Engaged citizenship emphasizes forms of political participa-
tion which are critical towards existing social arrangements, for example associative move-
ments, public demonstrations against government policies, or boycotts of particular brands.
Endorsing an engaged conception of citizenship represents an alternative to a political orga-
nisation based on the majority principle (e.g., voting), and should therefore be related to
distrust in the political system. Low status groups are more likely to endorse such an
engaged conception, since less conventional forms of political participation allow them to
make their claims heard in the political process. Nevertheless, Dalton (2008) showed that
education was positively linked to both duty-based and engaged forms of political partici-
pation. It is thus possible that among the highly educated, both types of democratic partici-
pation co-exist, because they both represent legitimate forms of political participation.
Moreover, Swiss citizenship as such is an important pre-requisite for duty-based political
participation since only Swiss Citizens are allowed to participate in political decision-
making at the national level. Voting, as the typical example of duty-based citizenship,
should therefore be more important for Swiss citizens. Finally, a lack of interest in politics
and feelings of political powerlessness should lead to the rejection of any kind of political
participation, that is, of both duty-based and engaged forms of citizenship.
Hypotheses
Our general hypothesis states that the eﬀect of social positions (i.e., social status and politi-
cal integration) on political trust is mediated by the endorsement of normative beliefs. We
predict that lower positions in the social structure generate greater uncertainty and vulnera-
bility which in turn give rise to stronger perceptions of social problems and a more pessi-
mistic outlook on society. The outcome should be lower trust in the Swiss political regime.
We now summarise the hypotheses, schematized in Figure 1, which will guide the analysis
of the data.
1a. Anchoring of political trust in social status. Because high status groups (assessed with
education level, income and perceived material risk) are more likely to perceive the
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political system as acting in their interest, members of high status groups will express
greater political trust than low social status.
1b. Anchoring of political trust in political integration. Because politically integrated individ-
uals have more knowledge of the Swiss political regime and feel empowered in political
decision-making, they will trust the current political authorities more than those with
low levels of political integration.
2a. Anchoring of the conceptions of social order threats in social status. High social status
should give rise to lesser perceived threat to social order on all four dimensions, because
high status participants should feel less uncertainty and insecurity in their life.
2b. Anchoring of citizenship norms in social status. High social status should lead to the
endorsement of duty-based citizenship norms, because traditional forms of political
participation are seen as fostering a social order beneﬁcial for their group interest. Low
status citizens should favour engaged citizenship norms, because it represents an alter-
native type of political participation which is potentially critical towards the political
establishment. Education level may however lead to the endorsement of both citizenship
norms.
2c. Anchoring of perceived social order threats in political integration. Politically less inte-
grated individuals should perceive greater threat to social order, since perceived power-
lessness and lack of political interest is conducive to a pessimistic and threatening
outlook on society.
2d. Anchoring of citizenship norms in political integration. Engaged and duty-based citizen-
ship norms should be lower among less politically integrated people, because they do
neither have much interest in politics, nor do they feel much power in political decision-
making.
Figure 1: Conceptual Mediation Model of Political Trust.
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3a. Mediation of social status by social order threats. Perceived social order threats are
expected to mediate the eﬀect of social status on political trust. More speciﬁcally, we
expect a pattern where low social status gives rise to higher perceived social order threat
which in turn decreases political trust.
3b. Mediation of political integration by social order threats. We expect social order threats
also to mediate the eﬀect of political integration on trust, since political integration
should lead to more serene views about the social order, and thus to greater trust in
political authorities.
3c. Mediation of social status by citizenship norms. Higher social status should predict
greater trust, because high status individuals should embrace traditional duty-based citi-
zenship norms (voting and elections). In contrast, low status individuals deﬁned with
high perceived material vulnerability should embrace engaged citizenship norms. Never-
theless, highly educated individuals may also endorse engaged citizenship norms (cf.
2b). They may thus trust the political authorities because they believe a democratic
regime also takes alternative political participation into consideration.
3d. Mediation of political integration by citizenship norms. Political integration should lead
to greater endorsement of duty-based and engaged citizenship norms, because both
political participation types are seen as legitimate. Consequently, this should lead to
greater political trust.
4. Speciﬁc paths between social status and social order threat vs. political integration and citi-
zenship norms. Because political participation is linked to political interest and agency,
citizenship norms are expected to mediate in particular the impact of political integration
on trust in political authorities. In contrast, social status should generate speciﬁc views
on society which then translate into political trust. In other words, we expect social status
to predict political trust through lay conceptions of social order, while the impact of
political integration on trust should be more strongly related to citizenship norms.
Method
Data and Procedure
The data were collected in the framework of a Swiss National Science Foundation Research
Programme on the Swiss Welfare State (PNR45 ‘‘Proble`mes de l’Etat social’’). This survey
was designed to assess the perceived legitimacy of the Swiss welfare state, and contains a
number of other variables which are not used in the present study. This database is particu-
larly appropriate to test our hypotheses regarding political trust, since it contains all the
items required by the model of lay conceptions of social order (for more details, see Staerkle´
et al., 2007).
Based on random lists of inhabitants provided by municipal administrations, data were
collected for working-age adults aged between 20 and 65 years (N = 769: response
rate = 49%). The data collection took place between September 2001 and February 2002
with face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes by trained interviewers. The participants
were recruited in four cities: two from the French speaking part of Switzerland (Lausanne:
N = 195, and Neuchaˆtel: N = 198) and two from the German speaking part (Bern:
N = 194, and St-Gallen: N = 182). Originally constructed in French, the questionnaire was
translated and back-translated for the German-speaking respondents. Variable names, means
and standard deviations, as well as item wordings and scales are reported in the Appendix.
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Category membership variables
Mean age was about 41. There were 395 women and 374 men in the sample. A large major-
ity were Swiss citizens (82.2%, N = 632, missing = 6), while the rest were foreigners
established in Switzerland (17.0%, N = 131). A majority of the foreigners (N = 92) were
citizens (in descending order) of Italy, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal (12.0%), while
39 respondents (5.0%) were citizens of other countries. This sample can thus be qualiﬁed as
representative of the adult population in working age living in the four Swiss cities. Since
citizenship, linguistic region, age (standardized from self-reported age), and gender of par-
ticipants are variables that may aﬀect political trust, they were controlled for in the analyses
as category membership variables. Our research question does not bear on political orienta-
tion as such, but given its potential importance as an explanatory variable of political trust,
we also controlled for political orientation with a measure of political ideology (left, moder-
ate left, centre, moderate right and right).
Social Status
Two objective measures and one subjective measure were used to assess social status.
(1) Objective measures of social status. The objective position was assessed through educa-
tion level and household income of respondents. Education level was measured with an
ordinal variable (primary school, N = 62, apprenticeship, N = 244, secondary school,
N = 259, university, N = 201). Household income was measured in absolute Swiss
Francs: Less than 2000 CHF per month (N = 66), 2000-3000 CHF (N = 207); 3000–
4000 CHF (N = 157), 4000–6000 CHF (N = 255), over 6000 CHF (N = 84).
(2) Material Risk. Material risk was assessed with a four-item scale (a = .77) measuring
participants’ perceived likelihood to be at risk regarding their future ﬁnancial situation
as a function of anticipated negative life course events. As a measure of perceived risk
of social declassiﬁcation, this subjective measure complemented the objective measure of
social status.
Political integration
Two measures were used to assess political integration. The ﬁrst measure was the self-per-
ception of a lack of power in political decision-making. We labelled this measure perceived
powerlessness and consider it as an indicator of non-integration. The second measure was a
proxy for political interest and political knowledge, assessed with a single item asking the
frequency of political discussion with friends and family.
Perceived social order threats
Twelve items were used to measure the four social order threats (three items for each
threat). Appendix 1 gives the wording for the items measuring immorality threat, free rider
threat, diversity threat and inequality threat. To test whether the twelve items were orga-
nized according to the assumed four-dimensional structure, we ran an ICLUST analysis
(Revelle, 1979; Zinbarg et al. 2005). This method checks the homogeneity of the subscales
represented by the four theoretical dimensions (measured with the beta coeﬃcient) com-
pared to higher level sub-sets of items. It also assesses the reliability of each subscale with
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Cronbach’s alpha coeﬃcient (Cooksey and Soutar, 2006; Revelle, 1979; Zinbarg et al.
2005)2. The ICLUST analysis was ran on ‘‘R’’ (http://personality-project.org/r/r.guide.html
for available procedures and scripts), and plotted with the ‘‘Graphviz’’ open access software
(Figure 2). The four dimensions were both satisfactorily homogenous (all bs ‡ .50) and reli-
able (all as > .60)
Citizenship Norms
Following Dalton (2008) we constructed two citizenship norms. Duty-based citizenship was
assessed with a single item asking respondents whether they agreed with the idea that elec-
tions and referenda were a good way to make citizens’ desires heard by the government.
Engaged citizenship was assessed with a 9-item scale (a = .80) of support for alternative
paths of political participation.
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α
β
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Figure 2: I-CLUST Analysis on Items Measuring Perceived Threats to Social Order.
Note: Cf. Appendix for complete variable label.
2 According to Cooksey and Soutar (2006: 80) ‘‘Whereas coeﬃcient alpha is deﬁned as the mean of all possible
half-split reliabilities of a scale, coeﬃcient beta is an estimate of the lowest or minimum value in the collection of
possible half-split reliabilities that are averaged to obtain coeﬃcient alpha’’, or, as deﬁned by Revelle (1979), ‘‘the
worst split-half’’. If a scale or a test ‘‘has a sizable beta as well as a sizable alpha, the test can be considered to be
assessing one construct’’ (Revelle, 1979: 71; see also Cooksey and Soutar, 2006 for a discussion of these criteria).
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Political Trust
A single item was used to assess the dependent variable political trust. Participants had to
rate their level of trust in the Federal Council (the government) and the political authorities
in general. This is a measure of diﬀuse political trust because it evaluated support for the
Swiss political regime as a whole.
Overview of the Analyses
We ﬁrst present a hierarchical regression analysis to test the direct paths between social sta-
tus and political integration (independent variables) on the one hand and normative beliefs
(mediating variables: hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d) and political trust (dependent variable:
hypotheses 1a and 1b) on the other. Seven hierarchical regression analyses were carried out:
one for each social order threat, two for the two citizenship norms and one for political
trust. Gender, age, citizenship, linguistic region and political orientation were controlled for
and will be directly discussed in the results section. In a second step, in order to examine
the cognitive underpinnings of political trust, a path analysis was computed to test the
mediating role of normative beliefs (perceived threats to the social order and citizenship
norms) in the construction of political trust (see Mackinnon et al. 2007). The goal of this
analysis is to illustrate how normative beliefs – which are anchored in social positions –
account for the eﬀect of a social position on political trust. In other words, this analysis
determines the extent to which normative beliefs explain the impact of the social position of
respondents on political trust.
Results
Social Anchoring of Conceptions, Citizenship Norms and Political Trust
(1) Eﬀects of category membership. Category membership variables (Table 1) had consider-
able eﬀects on both normative indicators and political trust. Women perceived higher
inequality threat and endorsed engaged-citizenship more than men. This result reﬂects
the subordinate position of women in the social structure which leads them to perceive
more social inequalities and endorse more alternative political participation norms.
Older generations, in contrast, perceived relatively more conservative immorality threat,
free rider threat and diversity threat, while endorsing less engaged citizenship norms
compared to younger generations. They also expressed greater trust in the political
authorities. Swiss citizens perceived more immorality and diversity threat than foreign
residents who in turn endorsed duty-based citizenship and trusted political authorities
more than Swiss citizens. Thus, the ﬁndings disconﬁrm the expectation that Swiss citi-
zenship favours duty-based citizenship. Rather, foreign residents seem to endorse more
strongly such citizenship norms, presumably reﬂecting a form of idealization of the
Swiss political system on their behalf. Then, a surprisingly strong eﬀect emerged which
showed French-speaking respondents to express much lower political trust than Ger-
man-speaking respondents. French-speaking respondents also perceived clearly more
immorality threat but, at the same time, less diversity threat than the German-speaking
majority. The German-speaking participants were thus more preoccupied by immigra-
tion than the French-speaking participants, who were more worried about urban vio-
lence and security issues. Finally, political orientation was neither linked to political
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trust, nor to duty-based citizenship. A right-wing orientation was however negatively
related to engaged-citizenship norms and inequality threat, and positively to the other
forms of social order threat. These ﬁndings indicate that the ideology of the political
right fuels conservative perceptions of the social order, the denial of social inequalities
and the refusal of alternative forms of citizenship.
(2) Eﬀects of political integration. Political powerlessness was strongly associated with politi-
cal distrust and all normative indicators. Individuals who feel that they have nothing to
say in the political process also experienced stronger immorality threat, were wary of
welfare abuse, perceived immigrants as a threat, and denounced social inequality (H2c).
Thus, feeling politically powerless gave rise to conceptions of a threatened social order
in which both duty-based and engaged forms of political participation were considered
ineﬀective (H2d) and political authorities could not be trusted (H1b). In comparison
with political powerlessness, political interest was much less associated with normative
beliefs, citizenship norms and political trust. We found that frequent political discussions
with friends and family favoured a serene perception of the free market order in which
welfare abuse is not a central problem, but increased the endorsement of traditional,
duty-based forms of political citizenship.
(3) Eﬀects of social status. A high level of education and the absence of material risk posi-
tively predicted political trust (H1a), while a low household income was only associated
with the endorsement of engaged citizenship principles.3 Perceived material risk gener-
ated a view of society as marred by strong social inequalities, but favoured also a con-
ception of an insecure and dangerous society (H2a). Material risk furthermore fuelled
the endorsement of engaged citizenship norms, but decreased the support for traditional
forms of political participation, in particular voting (H2b). Low levels of education gave
rise to welfare abuse suspicions as well as to negative apprehension of immigrants,
which suggests that higher levels of education contribute to a more carefree attitude
towards a free market society and social diversity. Finally, and in line with Dalton’s
(2008) results, respondents with a higher level of education were also more inclined to
endorse engaged citizenship norms, but contrary to Dalton we could not evidence a sig-
niﬁcant relationship between education and duty-based citizenship.
In the next section we test the third (3a, 3b, 3c and 3d) and fourth hypotheses concerning
the mediating function of the perceived social order threats and citizenship norms on politi-
cal trust.
Social Order Threats and Citizenship Norms as Mediators
Structural equation modelling is the most appropriate technique to test mediation hypothe-
ses (Iacobucci, 2008). We therefore conducted path analyses using Mplus software. In order
to produce the most parsimonious, yet complete mediation model, we speciﬁed a theoretical
model which simultaneously includes all the relevant variables, but contains only the links
that were signiﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant in the preceding regression models. We only
used the three positional determinants that were found to be signiﬁcantly linked to political
trust, that is, education level, perceived material risk and perceived political powerlessness.
The theoretical model then speciﬁes three independent variables (education, material risk,
3 Additional analyses showed that the eﬀect of income on trust was totally mediated by material risk perception:
Sobel z variance reduction test = 4.55, p < .001.
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and powerlessness), six mediating variables (immorality-, free-rider-, diversity- and inequal-
ity threat as well as duty-based and engaged citizenship norms) and one dependent variable,
political trust. All measures were observed, either as single item measures or as aggregated
scales (the internal consistency of indicators was presented in the method section).
The ﬁrst model was a total mediation model with no additional covariates between the
normative beliefs. This model did not reach satisfactory adjustment to the data. We then
used the modiﬁcation index provided by Mplus to progressively improve model ﬁt. We pro-
ceeded step by step, adding the best and theoretically relevant improvement at each step
before running another analysis. In this process, the direct eﬀect of perceived powerlessness
on political trust as well as nine covariates between the social order threats and the citizen-
ship norms were added: Engaged citizenship was linked to inequality, diversity, free rider,
and immorality threat; diversity threat was linked to free rider, immorality, and inequality
threat; free rider threat, ﬁnally, was linked to both immorality threat and inequality threat.
To simplify the presentation of the results, Figure 3 does not include these covariates. The
predicted mediation eﬀects are evidenced with indirect eﬀects the b coeﬃcient of which is
comparable to Sobel tests of variance reduction (indicating the signiﬁcance of variance
reduction of the direct eﬀect between the IV and the DV). The b coeﬃcient is the product of
(a) the direct link between a social position and a normative belief and (b) the link between
this normative belief and trust, controlling for the direct eﬀect of the social position on trust.
A signiﬁcant parameter in Table 2 thus indicates that the link between a social position and
political trust is mediated (that is, accounted for) by the endorsement of a normative belief.
Figure 3: Mediation Analysis on Political Trust (N = 765).
Note: + p < .10. * p < .05; ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Standardized coeﬃcients are reported.
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The model presented in Figure 3 showed the best ﬁt with the data: v2 (11) = 17.37,
p < .10; CFI = .995; TLI = .981; RMSEA = .027; SRMR = .019. Table 2 presents an
overview of the indirect mediation eﬀects. Our results ﬁrst illustrate that the eﬀect of mate-
rial risk on political trust was mediated by inequality threat, as well as by immorality threat
and to a lesser extent by duty-based citizenship. Hence, and in partial accordance with
hypothesis 3a and 4, the reason why people who feel materially at risk distrust political
authorities lies ﬁrst in perceptions of an unequal society in which social positions are
unfairly assigned by category membership rather than by meritocratic achievement. Second,
material risk fuels political distrust, because it translates into perceptions of social risk
whereby the society appears ever more dangerous and people no longer respect traditional
values. Finally, and somewhat less strongly, ﬁnancially insecure people also reject tradi-
tional forms of political participation such as voting which then leads to higher political dis-
trust.
Second, the eﬀect of education was mediated by immorality threat: much like materially
vulnerable people, those with a low level of education are more likely to see the world as an
immoral and dangerous place in which political authorities are not doing their job.
Although education is related to all but inequality threat, the direct eﬀects of free rider and
diversity threat on trust are not signiﬁcant, and hence neither the predicted mediation
eﬀects.
The third mediation eﬀects concern perceived powerlessness which was mediated, in
descending order of the indirect eﬀects, by duty-based citizenship, inequality threat, and
immorality threat. In line with hypothesis 3b, people who feel they have nothing to say in
the political process thus appear to distrust political authorities because ﬁrst of all they
reject the norms of traditional political participation. Moreover, they develop a view of an
unfair society which grants undue privileges to some and keeps others in subordinate posi-
tions, and the political authorities do not enough to change this state of aﬀairs. Finally,
much like vulnerable people and those with a low level of education, they see the world as
an immoral and unsafe place. It should also be noted that the direct eﬀect of perceived
powerlessness on political trust decreased, but remained powerful even when controlling for
the social order threats and the citizenship norms. In contrast, the direct eﬀects speciﬁcation
Table 2: Indirect eﬀects of social status and political integration on political trust (N = 769)
Material
vulnerability Education
Perceived
powerlessness
b SE b SE b SE
Social order threat
Inequality ).04*** .010 ––– ––– ).02** .007
Immorality ).03*** .008 .01* .006 ).02* .007
Free rider ––– ––– ).00 .011 .00 .008
Diversity ––– ––– .01 .011 ).01 .008
Citizenship norms
Engaged citizenship ).01 .006 ).01 .007 .02+ .009
Duty-based citizenship ).02** .007 ).01 .007 ).03*** .009
Note. Standardized parameters of indirect eﬀects (see text), SE = standard error. — = link is not
tested in the model.
*** = p < .001, ** = p < .01, * = p < .05. + = p < .10.
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of education and material risk on political trust did not improve the model which indicates
a satisfactory ﬁt with full mediations.
Discussion
The ﬁndings of this research tested a mediational model of political trust and demonstrated
how social status (in terms of education level and perceived material risk) and political inte-
gration (in terms of perceived political powerlessness and frequency of political discussion)
shaped trust in the Swiss political system. In line with our ﬁrst hypothesis (1a), we found
direct eﬀects showing that low levels of education and high levels of material risk decreased
political trust, while political orientation did not aﬀect trust. Perceived political powerless-
ness massively decreased political trust (hypothesis 1b), but the fact that people would or
would not discuss politics with family and friends was unrelated to trust. These results lar-
gely conﬁrm ﬁndings of earlier studies which have also shown a consistent negative relation-
ship between both objective and subjective social status and political trust (e.g., Anderson
and Tverdova, 2003; Brunner and Sgier, 1997; Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Citrin and
Muste 1999). Contrary to earlier studies, we could not ﬁnd an eﬀect of income on political
trust, possibly because this eﬀect was mediated by perceived material risk. It would seem,
then, that subjective deﬁnitions of social status in the form of the interpretations people give
to their social position are more important predictors of political trust than one’s objective
income situation. More generally, though, we surmise that the ﬁnding according to which
high status people are more likely to trust their government and political authorities reﬂects
the fact that their prior experiences with authorities and institutions were mostly positive,
and that the political system in which they live guarantees them a relatively favourable and
secure social position (Staerkle´, et al., 2007). Politically integrated individuals also seem to
trust political authorities because their political knowledge (Gaxie, 1978) matches the demo-
cratic principles of the Swiss political regime.
Our second hypothesis concerning the social anchoring of normative beliefs received par-
tial support. Perceived material risk (hypothesis 2a) predicted the perception of a dangerous
and inegalitarian society. People with experience (or anticipation) of ﬁnancial adversity come
to see the world in moral terms. It could be that such a perception would allow materially
vulnerable people to see themselves on the good side of society and thus to compensate to
some extent the potential social stigma associated with ﬁnancial hardship (Kay et al. 2005),
especially in Switzerland where social norms of hard work and self-suﬃciency are strongly
present (Lalive d’Epinay and Garcia, 1988). Material risk furthermore produces perceptions
of illegitimate inequality which suggests that one’s own experience of ﬁnancial diﬃculties
raises the awareness of the existence of wider inequalities, and thus of the idea that one is
not alone in this adverse situation. Finally, material vulnerability is positively associated
with engaged citizenship and negatively with duty-based citizenship (hypothesis 2b). People
feeling ﬁnancially at risk favour norms of alternative political participation over more tradi-
tional political practices such as voting, because alternative modes of participation are
potentially critical of political authorities who may be held responsible for one’s diﬃculties.
A low level of education strongly determined the perception of welfare abuse and threat-
ening diversity (hypothesis 2a), while unexpectedly neither income nor perceived material
risk had an impact on these normative beliefs. It appears then that free market threat and
social diversity threat are mostly ‘‘culturally’’ determined as higher education provides indi-
viduals with the necessary normative tools to counter prevailing ideas of welfare abuse and
immigration threat.
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Most consistently, political powerlessness (hypothesis 2c) predicted normative beliefs con-
cerning a society threatened by immorality and delinquency (moral order threat), by free-
riders and welfare abuse (free market threat), by immigrants and otherness in general (social
diversity threat) and by social inequalities (structural inequality threat). There can be no
doubt, then, that feelings of powerlessness and anomy are crucial predictors of a perception
of an unfair, disorganised, and dangerous world in which authorities and institutions fail,
or have failed, to bring about a better society. It ﬁts in this gloomy picture of society held
by the powerless that they oppose both traditional duty-based norms of citizenship and
engaged, alternative forms of political action (hypothesis 2d). Political interest, however,
assessed with the frequency of political discussion, was rather unrelated to normative
beliefs, besides that it attenuates the fear of welfare abuse (hypothesis 2c) and enhances the
support for duty-based citizenship (hypothesis 2d), which is consistent with research show-
ing that political competence leads to political participation (Converse, 1964; Dalton, 2008;
Bennett, 2006).
Unexpectedly, free market threat and diversity threat were unrelated to political trust
(hypotheses 3a and 3b). It would thus seem that cultural norms regarding welfare abuse
and immigration threat (which are strongly anchored in education level) are unrelated to
political trust. More importantly, education does therefore seem to play only a minor role
in shaping political trust, since the only signiﬁcant mediation (hypotheses 3a and 4) is found
with immorality threat (though the relationship between education and immorality threat is
weak). The ﬁndings rather suggest that material vulnerability, as a proxy of a threatened
social position and fear of declassiﬁcation (hypotheses 3a and 3c) as well as perceived
powerlessness, as a proxy of anomy (hypotheses 3b and 3d), are the key driving forces
behind political distrust. These two subjective indicators of social position have a stronger
impact on political trust than objective status (income and education) and objective political
integration (frequency of political discussions).
Material risk generates a worldview of an illegitimately unequal society with which politi-
cal authorities have not dealt adequately. Similarly, it gives rise to perceptions of social
insecurity and immorality to which authorities do presumably not grant suﬃcient attention.
Finally, but to a lesser extent (hypothesis 4), material risk decreases endorsement of tradi-
tional political participation norms which then also undermines political trust (hypothesis
3b). The signiﬁcant mediations with perceived powerlessness as the independent variable
show exactly the same picture (hypothesis 3c), but with a mediational path more strongly
deﬁned by duty-based citizenship (hypotheses 3c and 4). Nevertheless, a strong direct eﬀect
of powerlessness remains even after the introduction of all other normative beliefs. Subjec-
tive political integration thus seems to be the most important direct predictor of political
trust (hypothesis 1b). To sum up, powerless and low status individuals feel less secure and
face more uncertainty in their lives than high status and politically integrated individuals.
They do not rely on traditional political procedures (i.e., voting) to try to improve their
situation, and political authorities are not seen as reliable institutional partners for their life
projects (Emler and Reicher, 1995; 2005; Luhmann, 2000): they feel to be left on their own
and therefore distrust political authorities.
Our research was however qualiﬁed by limitations related to the data with which we
tested our models. Many studies use international surveys to examine political trust in a
comparative perspective (e.g., Anderson and Singer, 2008, Anderson and Tverdova, 2003,
Mishler and Rose, 2001). We have used only representative urban samples in the Swiss
context. While this database does not allow to study diﬀerences between urban and rural
areas (cf. Leuthold et al. 2007), it presents the signiﬁcant advantage that it contains items
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which were speciﬁcally tailored to the Swiss context and which therefore presumably ‘‘make
more sense’’ than the necessarily rather abstract items used in international surveys. The rel-
atively high correlations between many constructs seem to support this assertion. We are
not aware of any other dataset which would allow testing the model of lay conceptions of
social order in its entirety. Other national (e.g., SHP, Selects, Vox) and international data-
bases (e.g., ESS, ISSP, Eurobarometer) do not contain all the variables needed for such a
model.
Finally, our conceptual framework holds that normative beliefs are the underpinning cog-
nitive mechanism of political trust. Yet, within this framework it is often diﬃcult to pre-
cisely predict which of the normative beliefs (perceived social order threats and citizenship
norms) best mediates the eﬀects of a given independent variable and why. While it was for
example possible to predict that higher-status individuals would have more carefree concep-
tions of social order, it was more diﬃcult to predict which exact conception would best pre-
dict this mediation eﬀect, since to our knowledge no literature is available on this particular
process. This is why our research is a hybrid between theory testing and theory building
which tests speciﬁc hypotheses while leaving open the possibility to discover new and unex-
pected relationships.
Conclusion
Even though our database presents some shortcomings, this should not distract from the
substantial ﬁndings of our research which specify the processes underlying the relationship
between social status, political integration and political trust. The originality of the present
research stands in its articulation between classical political science research and a social
psychological perspective, which hopefully sheds some new light on the normative and cog-
nitive foundations of political trust. It proposes a complementary view on prior analyses
which have either studied the role of various demographic variables (Mishler and Rose,
1997, 2001), political integration (Cook and Gronke, 2005), citizenship norms (Dalton,
2008), or norms and values (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005) as determinants of political
trust. The key contribution of this social representations approach is to provide a pluralistic
and normative approach to political trust. We thus avoid the pitfalls of oversimpliﬁed mod-
els which assume that one single motivation (such as self-interest) would explain political
trust. Instead, our argument is that people refer to multiple forms of knowledge shared
within groups which serve as normative reference points in political debates. On the basis of
this shared, but not consensual knowledge, citizens make up their minds on political trust.
In our view, there is no reason to bemoan a generalized waning of democratic legitimacy
and an overall lack of support for the political system. Rather, it is important to analyse
why exactly citizens come to judge the government and political authorities as ineﬃcient,
useless or otherwise inappropriate. These reasons are most likely to be found in concrete
living experiences, in particular the risk of social declassiﬁcation and perceived political
powerlessness, which characterise the diﬀerent social positions in a hierarchically structured
national context such as Switzerland.
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Appendix
Overview of variables, with descriptive statistics, item wording and scales
Variable Mean SD Items wording Scale
Political trust 3.92 1.04 Degree of trust in the government
(Federal Council) and the
political authorities
1 = no trust at all
6 = complete trust
Inequality threat 4.57 .87 In Switzerland, there is still a lot
to do to reach true gender
equality
1 = totally disagree
6 = totally agree
Rich people become richer, poor
people become poorer
The way our society is organised
creates more and more poverty
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Appendix (Continued ).
Variable Mean SD Items wording Scale
Immorality threat 3.55 1.01 Switzerland becomes less safe,
because street delinquency is
rising
1 = totally disagree
6 = totally agree
Switzerland looses its moral
values, because a good
education is no longer a priority
Switzerland is likely to witness
more violent and chaotic mass
protests
Free rider threat 3.02 1.05 The problem with our welfare
system is that there is too much
abuse
1 = totally disagree
6 = totally agree
Welfare beneﬁciaries
have chosen
to sponge oﬀ the society
Welfare beneﬁciaries
lack will and
motivation
Diversity threat 2.38 1.03 Switzerland looses its identity,
because it becomes to close to
the EU
1 = totally disagree
6 = totally agree
Switzerland looses its identity,
because too many cultures mix
up
Foreigners should have the right
to vote at the municipal level if
they have lived in Switzerland
for at least 10 years (reverse
coded)
Duty-based
citizenship
4.17 .75 Voting and elections are a good
way to make the government
aware of citizens’ desires
1 = totally disagree
6 = totally agree
Engaged-citizenship 4.67 1.03 In order to inﬂuence political
decisions, to what extent is it
important to:
Boycott particular products
1 = not at all
important
6 = very important
Get media attention
Participate in public
demonstrations
Participate in illegal
protest actions
- Importance of the citizen rights
movements and associations:
Environment associations
1 = not at all
important
6 = very important
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Appendix (Continued ).
Variable Mean SD Items wording Scale
Citizen movements against free
market economy
Women rights movements
Antiracist associations
Trade Unions
Gender 0 = Male
1 = Female
Age 40.74 12.24 Age in years
Citizenship 0 = non Swiss
1 = Swiss
Linguistic region According to the City where the
survey took place
0 = German speaking
1 = French speaking
Perceived
powerlessness
3.40 1.47 People like me don’t have any
inﬂuence on the government
action
1 = totally disagree
6 = totally agree
Political discussion 3.27 .82 How often do you speak about
politics with friends or
family members
1 = never
5 = at least 30 min. ⁄ day
Political orientation 3.96 2.97 What are your political
preferences on a left-right scale
1 = left
3 = centre
5 = right
Income Category of household income in
CHF
1 = Less than 2000
2 = 2000 – 3000
3 = 3000 – 4000
4 = 4000 – 6000
5 = Over 6000
Education Highest level of completed
education
1 = Primary school
2 = Apprenticeship
3 = Secondary school
4 = University
Material risk 3.11 1.00 Likelihood
- to get unemployed
- to have diﬃculties to make
ends meet
- not to be able to adapt to
changing working conditions
- to need help from social
institutions
1 = not at all likely
6 = very likely
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